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ABSTRACT
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s historical 
analysis of Buddhist philosophy not only fails 
as a sound interpretation of that tradition, it 
also well-exemplifies the Western practice 
of Orientalism as elucidated by Edward Said. 
I attempt to demonstrate this in three major 
parts: the nature of Orientalism as a concept 
and practice, the Orientalist analytical 
process that Hegel employs in judging 
Buddhism as well as religions in general, 
and how Hegel’s understanding does not 
work against a more charitably interpreted 
Buddhist defense. Moreover, I argue that 
the Orientalist erroneousness of Hegel’s 
reading deeply complicates his hierarchical 
philosophy of world history.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DEEP PROBLEM OF HEGEL’S 
ANALYSIS
Few figures in the history of Western thought represent the 
mindset of Orientalism better than the German Idealist philosopher 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Moreover, few prominent systems 
of thought originating from the so-called Orient have been as 
significantly marred by the reductionism of Orientalism, both in 
its popular reputation as well as with the opinions of scholars, as 
Buddhism. Uncoincidentally, these two subjects are related. Hegel, 
as he and others did with many other rich systems of thought born in 
Asian countries, imperialistically swept the systematic philosophy of 
Shakyamuni Buddha and his many intellectual successors into his grand 
vision of a hierarchically structured world-system of religions. In doing 
so, Hegel ultimately served as one of the first prominent intellectual 
figures of the West to cement the popular superficial understanding 
of Buddhism as a form of crude nihilism. Through his reductive and 
instrumentalizing attempt to reveal Buddhism as a religion that is 
supposedly obsessed with indeterminate Nothingness, and therefore 
as inferior in the ordering of history (an understanding of the religion 
which he gained through superficial and secondhand European 
accounts), Hegel’s obfuscating analysis exhibits some of the essential 
attributes of Edward Said’s conception of Orientalism. Moreover, 
the fact of Hegel’s Orientalism, the fact of his erroneousness, both 
in his interpretation of Buddhism and in his subsequent use of it in 
constructing his Eurocentric view of religious history, poses a deep 
challenge for his overall system as it is oriented around the latter 
formulation. The problem of Hegel’s Orientalism is not just that his 
descriptive interpretation of Buddhism is significantly false, but that this 
hermeneutic inaccuracy puts his historical-religious teleological project 
into question.
II. WHAT IS ORIENTALISM?
Although Said employs multiple definitions of the term, the 
broad meaning of Orientalism, relevant to the aim of analyzing 
Hegel’s comparative philosophy, is encapsulated in the West’s self-
defining through a negative characterization of the Other. However, 
for the purpose of briefly noting the influence of Hegel’s views on the 
history of Buddhism’s Western reception, it is also worth mentioning 
another meaning. Orientalism may also be conceived as an epistemic 
representation of the discourse of power between the West and the 
East, more materially speaking.1 This dynamic, in which the act 
1 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 6.
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of portraying another culture in a certain way subordinates them 
in the eyes of the depicting society, is naturally influenced by the 
intellectual culture of the aforementioned society. Hegel, as one of 
the most influential intellectuals in the history of Western thought, 
consequently, has a clear role in bringing about this initially conceptual 
and subsequently social subordination upon the culture of Buddhism. 
This is all rooted, of course, in Hegel’s system of thought itself. What 
Hegel’s system of thought employs is notably comparable to the more 
theoretical methodology of Orientalism introduced above. This is the 
conception of Orientalism which is centered around an idea of the 
Orient as one of Europe’s “deepest and most recurring images of the 
Other.”2 The Orientalist mindset uses the Other—that is, the Middle 
East and Asia—to establish oppositional binaries which portray the 
West in a positive light and the East in a negative light. One of the most 
prominent and impactful of these binaries is the supposed distinction 
between European rationality and non-European irrationality.3 It is 
in this way that the philosophical nature of Orientalism is revealed, as 
a comparative venture in forming the essences of both Western and 
Eastern civilization. Of course, this comparative venture is, ultimately, 
a misrepresentative one in, at the very least, how it portrays the essence 
of Eastern peoples and their thought.
In trying to categorize the Orient as embodying some kind of 
negative aspect contrary to the Occident, the methodology which 
an Orientalist uses to establish this dichotomy is inherently based in 
overgeneralizing readings of a handful of popular cultural texts. In 
attempting to exhibit the Orient as irrational, among other attributes, 
Orientalists tend to focus on the most superficially representative pieces 
of text within a broad tradition and then extrapolate judgments from 
such texts about the culture as a spatiotemporal whole. An example 
of this sort of analysis would be that of Gustave von Grunebaum, an 
Austrian historian who strongly inherited the discourse of Orientalism 
concerning Arab culture. Von Grunebaum attempted to show that 
Islamic culture, in particular, is a monolithic, authoritarian, and 
irrational entity through, in part, “half-a-dozen references to Islamic 
texts drawn from as many periods as possible.”4 In other words, the 
study which leads von Grunebaum to make such assertions of Islamic 
culture being based in irrationality is a study which is not founded 
in systematic analysis. Rather, it is founded on the glossing-over of 
perhaps the most obvious of literature. This reinforces Said’s claim 
2 Said, Orientalism, 1.
3 Margaret Kohn and Kavita Reddy, “Colonialism,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, last modified August 
2017, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/colonialism/.
4 Said, Orientalism, 298.
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that one of the central dogmas of Orientalism are “abstractions about 
the Orient, particularly those based on texts representing a ‘classical’ 
Oriental civilization, are always preferable to direct evidence drawn 
from modern Oriental realities.”5 This is also exemplified by another 
reference of Said’s where he refers to the tendency for Arabists and 
Islamologists to forcefully apply doctrinal aspects of the Koran to entire 
particular cultures in the modern Islamic world.6 While, in this specific 
case, the dogma of Orientalism pertains to the specific studying of 
“classical” texts and extrapolating from those texts, this sort of principle 
can be generally applied to the practice of exclusively using readily 
available texts taken in isolation to make abstractions, which lead to 
judgments about the whole system. Hegel’s analysis of non-Western 
religions functions in precisely this manner.
III. ORIENTALISM AND THE HEGELIAN PROJECT
The Orientalist nature of Hegel’s incorrect reading of Buddhism 
into his world system is found in how he structured this system 
hierarchically and reductively as well as in the manner by which he 
derived it from other scholarly sources. In terms of its own theoretical 
content, Hegel’s writing on Buddhism is Orientalist in how he 
seeks to show the philosophical superiority of Western Christianity 
over Buddhism, and how he instrumentalizes a projected image of 
Buddhism to this end. Like the common Orientalist dichotomy 
between the rational Occident and the irrational Orient, Hegel tries 
to display the concretely grounded and dialectically mediated nature 
of Western metaphysics as a distinct accomplishment contrasted by 
the abstractness of Buddhism. Moreover, Hegel was able to write on 
this false, culturally biased dichotomy merely through the reading of 
the sparse and superficially documented sources on Buddhism that 
existed at the time. Hegel gained most of his knowledge on supposedly 
Buddhist concepts from the inherently incomplete encyclopedia, 
Allgemeine Historie, on Buddhism that was available during his life. 
Through its German mistranslations, this source provided Hegel 
with the term “Nothingness” as the ultimate metaphysical view of 
Buddhism, or what was in actuality the mistaken misinterpretation for 
“emptiness.”7 The severity of this interpretative mistake will be shown 
later. While Hegel cannot be blamed for the lack of accurate knowledge 
available on what was, at the time, such a distant tradition, he can 
5 Said, Orientalism, 300.
6 Said, Orientalism, 301.
7 Timothy Morton, “Hegel on Buddhism,” in Romanticism and Buddhism: 
Romantic Circles Praxis Series, ed. Mark Lussier (College Park: University of 
Maryland, 2007), para. 1-42, https://romantic-circles.org/praxis/buddhism/
morton/morton.html.
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in fact be blamed and deemed a pernicious Orientalist for using the 
little crude information that was available to construct a Eurocentric 
worldview. Like the Orientalists, which Said studied in his analysis of 
the power relations between the West and the Middle East, Hegel took 
the most readily available and obvious resources for a Westerner and 
used those texts in isolation to extract widely judgmental claims from 
them. Even if Hegel had the best possible intentions in his thought, 
believing not that the West ought to be brought up at the intellectual 
expense of the East, but rather, simply that the West has attained a more 
sufficient rationality for the East to learn from, only makes Hegel’s 
project more Orientalist. His genuine belief, as a matter of purported 
objective fact and not merely as a result of subjective supremacist 
intentions, in the categorical inferiority of non-Western philosophy 
reveals the Orientalism (par excellence!) of his thinking. In other 
words, even if Hegel’s own intentions were not explicitly Orientalist, 
his acts of judgment—in which he declared to himself in the manner 
of, “well, this is just the way it is,” that an entire non-Western 
intellectual culture is rationally inferior—nonetheless were.
Even with his analysis of religion as a whole, Hegel shows a 
tendency towards the instrumentalizing of other systems of thought 
towards Western idealistic ends. His philosophy of religion is 
characterized primarily by how religion dialectically unfolds into more 
actualized forms over time. As Hegel says, “The whole of philosophy 
is nothing else but a study of the definition of unity; and likewise, the 
philosophy of religion is just a succession of unities, where the unity 
always [abides] but is continually becoming more determinate.”8 
When Hegel speaks of unity and its becoming more determinate, 
he is referring to the process of reality constituting itself dialectically 
throughout history, or more specifically, through the process of 
sublation. Sublation is what occurs when two supposedly opposed 
concepts in history overcome their inherent contradictions and achieve 
a greater resolution. This dynamic is in essence what is meant by the 
dialectic, for Hegel.9 Starting from this philosophical foundation, 
Hegel then seeks to show how the reality of religion is determined in 
this way just as well. Starting from the abstract concept of religion, 
Hegel attempts to demonstrate how particular real-world religions 
arise and how, eventually, they become synthesized with an abstractly 
universal idea of religion into the ultimate individual consummate 
form. For Hegel, this consummate religion, not unexpectedly, turns 
8 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, ed. 
Peter C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 379-80.
9 Mario D’Amato and Robert T. Moore, “The Specter of Nihilism: On Hegel on 
Buddhism,” Student-Faculty Collaborative Research Publications 28 (2011): 26-27, 
https://scholarship.rollins.edu/stud_fac/28/.
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out to be Christianity.10 This status is attained through its thoroughly 
mediatory elements, as conceptually embodied by the idea of the 
Trinity. For Hegel’s view of Christian theology, the Father represents 
a purely immanent conception of God as “in and for itself,” and the 
Son represents the differentiation of God into the world, as well as 
its reconciliation with God the Father. Along with the Holy Spirit as 
religious community, this view of the mediated Trinity “articulates 
the complex life of God, which unfolds from self-identity through 
differentiation and otherness to completion and wholeness.”11 Because 
God, for Hegel’s conception of Christianity, does not simply reside 
within itself as pure Being, but rather dialectically includes itself in the 
specific determinations of our perceivable or conceivable reality, it is 
a more rational and in fact the rational system of religion. By contrast, 
in Hegel’s view as shall be soon shown, Eastern religions such as 
Buddhism have not surpassed conceiving of the ultimate qua merely 
immanent or abstractly immanent, and are thus inferior.
Altogether, this reflects Hegel’s broader perspective that, 
historically, the West stands as the ultimate end of progress, whereas 
the East may always resemble its lesser stages.12 Despite the West and 
non-West being coeval and equally inhabited by rational human beings 
with remarkable forms of thought, the various cultures of the non-
Western world are taken as mere prior steps leading up to the pinnacle 
development of the West. It is in this sense that, in the fashion of a 
typical Orientalist scholar, Hegel seeks to instrumentalize the meaning 
of the East towards the end of a positive construction of the West; that 
is, he takes an image of a philosophy that is purported to be a truthful 
description of said philosophy and uses it to uplift European intelligence 
into supremacy. With Hegel’s altogether Eurocentric understanding 
of the philosophical history of religion presented, his interpretation 
of Buddhism and the role that its intellectual culture plays within his 
system will now be shown. 
IV. THE HEGELIAN-ORIENTALIST CRITIQUE OF 
BUDDHISM
Overall, Hegel sees Buddhism as a philosophy dedicated to the 
indeterminate universal reality of Nothingness. In other words, this 
idea of Nothingness is the basis of all reality. Furthermore, as Hegel 
10 D’Amato and Moore, “The Specter of Nihilism,” 29-30.
11 Peter C. Hodgson, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Frederick C. Beiser 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 244-45.
12 Heinrich Dumoulin, “Buddhism and Nineteenth-Century German 
Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 42, no. 3 (1981): 460, 
10.2307/2709187.
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says, “If an analysis of these various forms were attempted, they 
would lose their quality; for in themselves all things are one and the 
same inseparable essence, and this essence is Nothingness.”13 The 
Buddhist, for Hegel, views ultimate reality as nothing more than an 
all-encompassing Nothingness, in that any form that is supposedly 
determinate or individual is, in actuality, ultimately reducible to 
this Nothingness. One may tentatively describe Nothingness in this 
sense as pure Nothingness. This is useful for these purposes, because 
it more clearly reflects Hegel’s notion of absolute, or pure Being. 
This relation is evident, for Hegel, in that when one considers pure 
Being—you have nothing but Being in itself without any specifiable 
determinants. In other words, you have Being as a purely abstract 
concept. Because Being is completely abstract when considered in this 
manner, it is in fact no different from pure Nothingness. It is for this 
reason that Hegel says that “The Nothing which the Buddhists make 
the universal principle, as well as the final aim and goal of everything, 
is the same abstraction” as pure Being. Hegel would say, then, that 
the highest metaphysical principle of Buddhism is that “the Absolute 
is the Nought.”14 The practical implications of this doctrine, by 
Hegel’s interpretation, amount broadly to the goal of uniting oneself 
with Nothingness. This specifically results in the attainment of doing 
nothing, absolutely, thus reaching a sort of complete detachment from 
all activities.15 Altogether, Hegel seeks to characterize Buddhism as a 
kind of nihilism, not in the sense that Buddhism posits that there is no 
meaning to life or reality, but in the sense that it worships Nothingness 
qua total nihility, both theoretically and practically. Hegel’s critique of 
Buddhism, then, as an inferior system of thought, is that it reifies and 
worships the abstract.
V. INTERPRETATIVE RECTIFICATION: “EMPTINESS,” 
NOT “NOTHINGNESS”
Through a rectified understanding of Buddhist “Nothingness” 
instead of “emptiness,” one may see that Hegel’s assessment of 
Buddhism as a fanatical school of nihility is deeply erroneous. If one 
is to examine systematic Buddhist philosophy as it has manifested 
itself under the dominant discursive trends of the Mahayana sect 
(this sect in particular being the main instantiation of Buddhism that 
German scholars encountered, as with the encyclopedia referenced 
13 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree 
(Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 187.
14 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Logic: Being Part One of the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. William Wallace (Pacifica: 
Marxists Internet Archive, 2009), 229.
15 Dumoulin, “Buddhism and Nineteenth-Century,” 462-63.
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above), one may see that this metaphysical concept which Buddhism 
espouses is not concerned with nothingness in the relative, void-like 
sense, but instead specifically regarding the idea of self-existence, 
or inherent existence. It is in this sense that the term “emptiness” is 
preferable, as this Buddhist philosophy simply sought to show that 
no entities in existence have a metaphysically independent status; 
that is, all things are interdependent or relational, or “empty” of 
inherent existence.16 As it turns out, Buddhist doctrine in actuality 
could not possibly worship nihility, because that would entail that 
nothingness exists in itself, which is an impossibility according to 
the metaphysical notion of emptiness: “For a Buddhist, to say that 
emptiness is absence of determination is a determination.”17 Hence, 
Hegel’s critique of pure Nothingness, in fact, has rather little to do with 
the ultimate metaphysical views of the systematic Buddhist philosophy 
which he claimed to understand. Rather, Hegel’s attribution of pure 
Nothingness to the core of Buddhism is more like a projection of his 
own conception of the dialectic onto the world—this dialectic, with 
regards to the development of religion, ultimately culminating in what 
he saw as the inherently more dialectical form that is Christianity. In 
his own religion, Hegel saw the accomplishment of critically logical 
thinking in religion; Christianity was to be given the prime seat 
philosophically. But, by Hegel’s own view, if the Christian God is to 
be conceived as absolute insofar as “Absolute spirit is utterly connected 
with everything: it is nothing but relationality,” then how can a religion 
in which, as expressed above, the ultimate truth is nothing else but the 
absolute relationality of all things be any worse off?18
The projection aspect of Hegel’s view must be stressed: what we 
see with the error of Hegel’s analysis of Buddhism is not only just error 
in itself, but, more importantly for Hegel’s own beliefs, its impact on 
his view of history. Hegel claims that the history of religions must be 
understood as a progression, as a unified development that positively 
unfolds more and more over time, becoming more and more united 
with itself. With this in mind, for Hegel, the societies of the world 
variably express this progression through their unequal roles in its 
hierarchy. By this view, although the West was indeed once just as 
undeveloped, non-Western regions of the world such as India or China 
reveal the way in which societies may be merely following the progress 
of the West from behind through their comparative inferiority. Hegel 
thus claims to offer a view from nowhere, having supposedly attained 
a kind of absolute or totalistic knowledge of the world and the nature 
16 Morton, “Hegel on Buddhism,” para. 29. 
17 Morton, “Hegel on Buddhism,” para. 40.
18 Hodgson, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion,” 245.
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of its advancement. Now, we may see that the falsity of his particular 
judgments of Buddhism (alongside what are likely equally problematic 
interpretations of other non-Western religious-philosophical traditions) 
complicates this absolutizing view strongly. While Hegel claimed 
to have demonstrated a form of transcendently systematic knowing 
of religion, in actuality, the interpretation that he employed in the 
foundational premises leading up to his absolutist conclusion has been 
revealed to be little more than a spurious mapping-onto with what 
are really Hegel’s own notions. Hence, his conclusions are anything 
but transcendent; rather, they are more so utterly provincial in how 
they derive from what are veritably Western notions which could only 
describe Buddhism inaccurately.
VI. CONCLUSION: HEGELIAN HISTORY CHALLENGED
As a matter of methodology, interpretation, and 
instrumentalization, Hegel’s philosophical treatment of Buddhism is 
Orientalist. Methodologically, Hegel drew his reading of Buddhism as 
a whole from inherently limited non-Buddhist resources which were 
marked by crucial mistranslations. Interpretatively, using the most 
essential mistranslation of “Nothingness” as opposed to “emptiness,” 
Hegel showed the result of his Orientalist methodology through his 
misunderstanding of the core concept of the Mahayana Buddhist 
view; he interpreted the philosophy to be engaging in a conceptual 
reification, when in fact it was itself a critique of reification. Finally, 
this untrue representation of Buddhism was used to prop up Western 
philosophy and religion. Hegel’s Western judgment believed that the 
wrongness of the East played an essential role in exhibiting the rightness 
which the West had attained. Each of these stages in the process of his 
Orientalist analysis also play a role in displaying how this very attempt 
at elevating the West fails. Given that Hegel’s glorifying of his own 
cultural sphere hinges on the relative deficiencies of Eastern thought, 
exemplified in particular by Buddhism, the actual non-existence of 
these perceived deficiencies proves that this self-aggrandizing view of 
history is untenable. A more careful and charitable reading of the non-
Western philosophical traditions of the world will tend to, as has been 
demonstrated with the case of Buddhism, reveal rational theories that 
are certainly comparable to those of Western traditions. Consequently, 
a historicist view, which places one culture above the other, will 
generally not stand.
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